



Any Link Between Legal Central Bank 
Independence and Inflation? Evidence 
from Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Luis I. Jácome and Francisco Vázquez 
  
© 2005 International Monetary Fund  WP/05/75  
 
IMF Working Paper 
 
Monetary and Financial Systems Department 
 
Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation?  
Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Prepared by Luis I. Jácome and Francisco Vázquez
1 
 






This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 
those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are 
published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
 
This paper reviews central bank legislation in 24 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean during the 1990s. Using panel regressions, we find a negative relationship 
between legal central bank independence (CBI) and inflation. This result holds for three 
alternative measures of CBI and after controlling for international inflation, banking crises, 
and exchange regimes. The result is also robust to the inclusion of a broader indicator of 
structural reforms that usually go along with changes in central bank legislation, illustrating 
the complementary nature of various aspects of economic reform. The paper fails, however, 
to find a causal relationship running from CBI to inflation. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers:  E42, E58 
 
Keywords:  Central bank independence, inflation, structural reform, Latin America 
 
Author(s) E-Mail Address:  Ljacome@imf.org, fvazquez@imf.org 
 
                                                 
1 Monetary and Financial Systems Department, International Monetary Fund. Luis Jácome is 
also Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University. We thank Ari Aisen, Alain Ize, 
Tony Lybek, Eric Parrado, Peter Stella, Hector Torres, Kal Wajid, and seminar participants at 
the IMF’s Monetary and Financial System Department. The authors are grateful to 
Eduardo Lora for providing a database on structural reforms in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Any errors are exclusively the authors’ responsibility. 
 - 2 - 
 
 
                                                                      Contents  Page 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................3 
II. Measures of Legal Central Bank Independence....................................................................6 
A. The GMT and Cukierman Indexes............................................................................6 
B. The Modified Cukierman Index................................................................................7 
 
III. A Map of Central Bank Reform in Latin America and the 
      Caribbean During the 1990s................................................................................................9 
 
IV. Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin America 
       and the Caribbean: Is There a Link?.................................................................................14 
A. Baseline Results......................................................................................................18 
B. An Alternative Specification: The Role of Structural Reforms..............................19 
C. Accounting for Endogeneity...................................................................................22 





1. List of Country Groups Based on Cluster Analysis.............................................................12 
2. Summary Statistics Across Country Groups .......................................................................13 
3. Summary Statistics by Regions, 1990–2002 .......................................................................16 
4. Pair-Wise Correlations Between Selected Variables, by Regions, 1990–2002...................17 
5. Correlations Between Indexes of Legal Central Bank Independence, by Regions .............17 
6. Panel Regressions of Inflation on Contemporaneous Central Bank Independence.............20 
7. Panel Regressions of Inflation on Contemporaneous Central Bank Independence 
(Including Structural Reforms)........................................................................................21 
8. Panel Regressions of Inflation on MCI Using Instrumental Variables................................23 
 
Figures 
1. Cluster Analysis Based on the Components of the Modified Cukierman...........................11 
2. International Inflation and Inflation in Sampled Countries, 1990–2002.............................15 
 
Appendices 
I.  Structure of the Cukierman and Modified Cukierman Indexes...........................................25 
II. GMT Index and the Independence of Central Banks..........................................................29 
 
  - 3 - 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The 1990s was accompanied by deep changes to central bank legislation in many countries. 
The common denominator was the increased autonomy and accountability granted to central 
banks in the design and execution of monetary policy with the objective of attaining price 
stability.
2 These legal reforms were considered particularly promising in countries with a 
previous history of inflation and excessive government interference in monetary policy for 
short-term political purposes (i.e., to finance fiscal expenditure or to stimulate economic 
activity). After a period of persistent inflation and macroeconomic instability, central bank 
reform was widely adopted by Latin American countries (LAC) during the 1990s. In 
contrast, changes to central bank legislation were largely absent among Caribbean countries 
(CAR). 
On theoretical grounds, central bank reform has been motivated by the insights of the early 
time-inconsistency models of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), 
which showed that governments facing a trade-off between inflation and unemployment are 
tempted to choose higher-than-optimal inflation rates. Later work pioneered by Rogoff 
(1985) proved that this inflationary bias could be reduced by delegating monetary policy to 
an independent and conservative central bank. This class of models implied that the 
institutional characteristics of a central bank could have important effects on inflationary 
outcomes, providing the basis for a subsequent wave of central bank reform. 
In fact, on the empirical side, the evidence from industrial countries seems to support the idea 
that increased central bank independence (CBI), usually proxied by the provisions contained 
in central bank laws, or by the turnover rate of central bank governors, is negatively 
associated with inflation (see a survey by Berger et al., 2000).
3 But the possibility of reverse 
                                                 
2 In this paper, the terms “autonomy” and “independence” are used interchangeably, as is 
usual in the literature. As pointed out by Lybek (1998), however, their interpretation may be 
different since autonomy implies operational freedom, while independence may be 
interpreted as the absence of political or institutional interference. 
3 However, these findings have been contested on several grounds. Some authors have argued 
that the relationship between CBI independence and inflation originates from a third (latent) 
variable such as the “opposition to inflation” (Posen, 1995) or the national “culture” toward 
inequality (De Jong, 2002). More importantly, Campillo and Miron (1997) showed that the 
negative relationship between CBI and inflation obtained in Cukierman et al. (1992) 
disappeared after including additional controls, suggesting that the result was driven by an 
omitted variable bias. Building on this critique, a more recent study by Brumm (2000) was 
able to recover the negative relationship between CBI and inflation after making a correction 
in the estimation method, to account for the possibility of measurement error in the CBI 
index.   - 4 - 
 
causality running from CBI to inflation behind these results has not been ruled out, and is 
widely recognized in the existing literature (Possen, 1993, 1995).  
The evidence from developing countries is both scarcer and less conclusive. An early study 
by Cukierman et al. (1992) reported a negative relationship between legal CBI and inflation 
for industrial countries, but failed to obtain similar results for developing countries. This 
asymmetry was attributed to a larger gap between legal and effective CBI in developing 
countries, possibly eroding the usefulness of the legal indicator as a measure of effective 
CBI. A study by De Haan and Kooi (2000), however, using the turnover of central bank 
governors as a more direct measure of effective CBI for a sample of 82 countries in the 
1980s, also failed to find a robust relationship between CBI and inflation.
4 These two studies, 
however, are subject to some caveats. First, as usual in this literature, they fail to control for 
potential determinants of inflation, opening the possibility for an omitted variable bias. 
Second, the conclusions are based on a cross-country approach, and thus fail to capture the 
temporal dimension of central bank reform—an issue particularly relevant for the case of 
developing countries. Third, the results do not take into account the possible endogeneity of 
central bank reform. Some of these shortcomings have been addressed in other papers. The 
possibility of omitted variable bias was tackled by Loungani and Sheets (1997), who used a 
sample of transition economies and reported a negative relationship between CBI and 
inflation, even after controlling for other measures of economic policy such as fiscal 
performance and economic reforms. A step forward was taken by Cukierman et al. (2002), 
who extended the Cukierman (1992) index to 26 transition economies during the 1990s, 
keeping track of CBI both during pre- and post-reform periods. After controlling for price 
liberalization, they concluded that increased CBI was unable to contain the initial inflationary 
effects of price decontrols, but showed that higher CBI became effective against inflation 
after the reform process acquired momentum. 
This paper is related to Cukierman et al. (2002) in two respects. First, it extends the 
Cukierman index to a (regional) sample of developing countries during the 1990s, keeping 
track of CBI during the pre- and post-reform periods, and exploiting both the cross-sectional 
and the time dimensions of the data. In fact, the sample of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries during the 1990s provides a rich experiment for the hypothesis being tested, given 
the widespread adoption of central bank reform and the extraordinary reduction in inflation 
attained during this period.
5 Second, it takes into account the effects of broader structural 
                                                 
4 In their study, the (negative) correlation between the turnover rate of central bank governors 
and inflation disappeared after the exclusion of a few high inflation countries from the 
sample. 
5 The evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean is scant and inconclusive. Jácome 
(2001) failed to find a clear relationship between increased CBI and inflation for a sample of 
Latin American countries. Gutiérrez (2003) reported a negative correlation using a sample of 
Latin American and the Caribbean countries and focusing on constitutional provisions on 
CBI.   - 5 - 
 
reform policies that usually go along with changes in central bank legislation. Since these 
typically include trade liberalization, labor market reform, privatizations, and other structural 
policies with potential effects on inflation, the results obtained are less vulnerable to the 
possibility of omitted variable bias. 
At the same time, this paper departs from Cukierman et al. (2002) in several ways. First, it 
builds three alternative measures of legal CBI, including the Grilli, Masciandaro, and 
Tabellini (GMT) (1991) index, and a new measure that adds several dimensions to the 
Cukierman index. These include the rules for the appointment of central banks’ board of 
directors (in addition to those for the appointment of central banks’ governors), the degree of 
CBI in the conduct of exchange rate policy, rules governing lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) 
facilities, and legal requirements on accountability and transparency.
6  Second, this paper 
exploits both the cross-sectional and time series dimensions of the data by using panel 
regressions. In contrast, the paper by Cukierman et al. (2002) works with the averaged values 
of the series during the pre- and post-reform periods, treating them implicitly as independent 
observations. Third, this paper tests for a causal relationship running from CBI to inflation, 
by taking into account the likely endogeneity of central bank reform. 
The results obtained in this paper show a strong negative relationship between increased CBI 
and inflation, after controlling for international inflation, banking crises, and exchange 
regimes in the sampled countries. This conclusion is robust to the inclusion of an index of 
broader structural reforms, suggesting that the findings are not driven by an omitted variable 
bias. Furthermore, structural reforms are shown to have a beneficial effect on inflation, which 
illustrates the complementary nature of various dimensions of economic policies. The 
qualitative results are robust to three alternative measures of central bank independence. On 
the other hand, after taking into account the possible endogeneity of central bank reform, the 
paper fails to find a casual relationship running from CBI to inflation. Taken at face value, 
these results suggest that the extraordinary disinflation achieved in Latin America and the 
Caribbean during the 1990s cannot be attributed to the increased legal CBI. These findings, 
however, are subject to an important caveat, since the legal measures of CBI used in this 
paper may be poor indicators of the effective central bank autonomy in the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the alternative indexes of CBI used in 
the regressions, and discusses the main differences between the Cukierman index and the 
modified version presented in this paper. Section III provides a map of the central bank 
reform in Latin America and the Caribbean using cluster analysis and the information 
contained in the indexes of CBI. Section IV performs an empirical exercise to assess whether 
increased legal CBI is somewhat related with inflation, and explores causality. Section V 
presents the main conclusions. 
                                                 
6 Lybek (1999) also develops an index of CBI—following a somewhat different approach—
that incorporates some of these criteria for a group of transition countries.   - 6 - 
 
II.   MEASURES OF LEGAL CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
This section describes the three indexes of de jure central bank independence used in this 
paper. The quantification applies to 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries—before and 
after the reform in the relevant cases. The first index follows the methodology proposed by 
GMT (1991). The second follows Cukierman (1992), which is probably the best known and 
most widely accepted index of central bank independence. The third builds on the structure 
of the Cukierman index, but adds several dimensions to capture key features of central bank 
reform in Latin America, plus some factors which are nowadays considered best practices in 
support of central banks’ autonomy and accountability.
7 In what follows, this index will be 
called Modified Cukierman Index (MCI). 
 
It is worth stressing that the assessment of CBI in this paper is based exclusively on legal 
provisions (constitutions and central bank laws), which may not be consistent with de facto 
independence. In practice, some central banks are more independent than what is implied by 
the law (the Caribbean countries and Brazil since the late-1990s are good examples), while 
others (such as Ecuador—before the dollarization in 2000—and Venezuela) are effectively 
less independent. The main discrepancies between de jure and de facto independence of 
central banks emerge in political independence, although some differences also arise in terms 
of operational independence and transparency. 
 
A.   The GMT and Cukierman Indexes 
Traditional indexes of CBI are based on legal criteria of political and economic 
independence. In the case of the GMT index, the assessment is based on the observance of 
15 criteria, each using a binary score of zero or one. The overall index is then constructed by 
simple addition of the resulting values, so a higher score indicates higher CBI. The GMT 
index defines political independence in terms of central bank responsibilities, the procedures 
for appointing the central bank government bodies, and the degree of government control 
over monetary instruments. Central banks that focus their main objective on preserving price 
stability, and where governments’ involvement in appointing and removing central bank 
governors are restricted, are said to be more politically independent. In turn, economic 
independence refers to restrictions on central banks to finance fiscal deficits and to the role 
they play in banking supervision. Again, a central bank is considered to be more independent 
when it faces higher restrictions to finance the fiscal deficit and lower responsibilities on 
banking supervision. 
 
In turn, the Cukierman index assesses the fulfillment of 16 criteria of political and economic 
independence using a continuous scale from zero to one, with higher values also indicating 
higher CBI. The overall index is based on a weighted average of the individual criteria.  
                                                 
7 Lybek (1998) discusses these practices, which are now part of IMF’s advice on central bank 
reform.   - 7 - 
 
The Cukierman’s index is also based on criteria of political and economic independence. On 
political independence, it focuses the assessment on various characteristics of the 
appointment and dismissal of the central bank’s governor. A central bank is considered more 
politically independent the longer the governor’s term in office, and the less dependent from 
the government are the procedures for his appointment and dismissal. On the other hand, a 
central bank enjoys higher economic independence the more restrictive are the provisions for 
central bank monetization of the fiscal deficit. The index also rewards CBI from the 
government in the formulation of monetary policy, and the focus of the legal mandate of the 
central bank on price stability. 
 
The structure of the Cukierman index, including the values assigned to each criterion and 
sub-criterion, and their corresponding weights, is presented in detail in Appendix I. The 
highest weight, 50 percent, is given to the legal provisions on central bank lending to the 
government, since this is considered the main source of inflation. An overall weight of 
20 percent is given to the modality of appointment, term in office, and dismissal of central 
bank governors, while the remaining 30 percent is equally distributed between policy 
formulation and the definition of the central bank fundamental objective. 
 
B.   The Modified Cukierman Index 
The MCI builds on the structure of the Cukierman’s index. It changes some of the 16 legal 
aspects of CBI considered in the Cukierman index, maintaining the four general 
classification criteria (i.e., appointment and dismissal of central bank authorities, 
independence for policy formulation, central bank objectives, and central bank lending), but 
adds a new category to measure central bank accountability. The structure and scores of the 
MCI are also spelled out in Appendix I, while a brief explanation of the rationale behind the 
main departures from the Cukierman index is provided below. 
 
The first departure relates to the political autonomy of the central bank. The MCI assesses the 
rules for the appointment and dismissal of the entire central bank’s board of directors, instead 
of focusing exclusively on the central bank governor. This innovation is relevant since the 
legal powers of central bank governors in the region represent only a minority fraction within 
the central bank board. Furthermore, the legal provisions for the appointment and term of 
office for the central bank governor may differ from those that apply to the rest of the board 
members. The criterion to evaluate the term of office of the central bank governor—and 
other members of the board of directors—is also different, since it considers the overlapping 
with the presidential term, to stress independence from the political cycle. An additional 
innovation emphasizes the restrictions on the executive branch to remove members of the 
board of directors—and not only the central bank governor. The criteria for the appointment 
and dismissal of central bank authorities also receive a different weight in the MCI index. In 
particular, the procedures for dismissal of the members of the central bank board, including 
the central bank governor, receive extra weight, since these are instrumental for enhancing 
the political autonomy of central banks. 
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The second innovation refers to the legal provisions for policy formulation. The MCI 
includes an assessment of CBI in the formulation of exchange rate policy, which is crucial 
for the conduct of monetary policy in small open economies. In addition, the evaluation of 
the central bank’s role in the formulation of the government’s budget, is shifted to consider 
the central banks’ role in approving public sector debt. While no central bank in the region 
plays a role in the elaboration or approval of the government budget, a number of them are 
required to approve public debt issuance, which provides an alternative instrument to help 
enforce fiscal discipline. 
 
The third variation relates to economic autonomy. The MCI simplifies the evaluation of the 
legal provisions on central bank lending to the government and includes two additional 
criteria, namely, central bank faculties as LOLR and provisions safeguarding central bank 
financial autonomy. The MCI rewards legal provisions that limit central banks involvement 
in banking crises, and those requiring the government to preserve the integrity of central 
bank capital. The relevance of LOLR provisions stems from the recent upsurge of banking 
crises in LAC, which in a number of cases involved central bank participation, with adverse 
effects on the conduct of monetary policy and the achievement of inflation objectives 
(Ecuador, Venezuela, and more recently Argentina, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic to 
mention the most salient).
8 Moreover, central banks’ involvement in banking crises, beyond 
LOLR assistance, can be viewed as a form of government financing, since the resources for 
banking resolution should typically come from the fiscal side. In turn, legal provisions 
requiring governments to preserve the integrity of central bank capital are also rewarded, as 
they facilitate the conduct of open market operations and, in general, the management of 
systemic liquidity without financial restrictions. 
 
The fourth and final innovation of the MCI is the addition of criteria for accountability, 
which is an integral component of central bank independence. Holding central banks 
accountable strengthens institutional credibility and hence underpins monetary policy 
effectiveness. Thus, the MCI rewards legal provisions that require central banks to report on 
a regular basis on their policy targets and achievements. Since transparency is an 
instrumental component of accountability, the MCI also gives credit to the mandatory 
publication of central bank financial statements on a regular basis and, in particular, when the 
disclosure of financial statements follows international accounting standards and is certified 
by an independent auditor. 
 
                                                 
8 In a number of countries in the region, central banks can potentially provide resources to 
troubled financial institutions in a number of ways, including extended LOLR support, 
financing bank resolution and restructuring, and financing deposit insurance schemes and 
government’s deposit guarantees.   - 9 - 
 
III.   A MAP OF CENTRAL BANK REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN   
DURING THE 1990S 
The early 1990s witnessed major structural reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Following the “lost decade”, these reforms were intended to consolidate stabilization efforts 
and pave the way to economic growth.
9 As part of the policy agenda, many countries 
introduced changes to central bank legislation with the objective of increasing CBI.
10 This 
section briefly describes progress in CBI in the region and depicts a map of central bank 
autonomy using information drawn from central bank laws and constitutions. The main 
features of central bank legislation are organized under the following five categories: 
(i) definition of the primary policy objective, (ii) political independence in the design and 
execution of monetary policy, (iii) economic independence, (iv) financial autonomy, and 
(v) accountability and transparency provisions. 
 
Overall, central bank reform was widespread in LAC but almost absent in CAR countries, 
with most central banks enjoying higher independence under the new regimes. The most 
prominent features of central bank reform in the region comprised a more focused mandate 
on price stability and the formalization of restrictions on central bank lending to the 
government. After the reforms, central banks also enjoyed increased autonomy in the conduct 
of monetary policy, including interest rate policy. On the other hand, there are some 
dimensions where central bank reform was insufficient and CBI could be further improved. 
Political independence in some countries could still be enhanced by restricting government’s 
capacity for unilaterally appointing and removing central bank governors and directors. 
Operational independence could be also improved by limiting excessive central bank 
discretion in the LOLR function, including the size and the financial conditions of LOLR 
facilities and the circumstances under which LOLR is triggered.
11 In a number of countries, 
                                                 
9 A number of studies have assessed the costs of inflation in terms of economic growth. 
Empirical evidence suggests a negative correlation between inflation and growth, which 
becomes stronger at higher levels of inflation. See for example Fischer (1993), Sarel (1996), 
and De Gregorio (1992) in relation to Latin American countries. 
10 Countries with central bank reform include: Chile (1989), El Salvador (1991), Argentina 
(1992 and 2002), Colombia (1992), Nicaragua (1992 and 1999), Venezuela (1992 and 2001), 
Ecuador (1992 and 1998), Peru (1993), Mexico (1993), Bolivia (1995), Costa Rica (1995), 
Uruguay (1995), Paraguay (1995), Honduras (1996 and 2004), Guyana (1998), and more 
recently Guatemala (2001) and the Dominican Republic (2002). 
11 While the notion of “constructive ambiguity” (see Enoch, Kamis, and Stella, 1997) is in 
general a valid recommendation in the design of the role of the central bank as LOLR, it may 
expose countries featuring institutional weaknesses—like many LAC—to undue exogenous 
pressures when dealing with banking crises and resolution.     - 10 - 
 
there is also room for improving central bank financial independence and transparency, 
including the disclosure of financial statements.
12 
The comparison of CBI across countries is relatively complex given the large number of 
aspects involved. A convenient approach to circumvent this complexity and to depict a map 
of central bank reform in the region is to use cluster analysis. This methodology creates 
groups of countries based on their relative similarities along various dimensions of CBI, 
which requires an index of central bank independence, and a metric for comparison purposes. 
The exercise presented here is based on the MCI, using the Euclidean distance as a measure 
of dissimilarity between countries, which has the advantage of being widely used.
13 The 
algorithm, known as hierarchical single linkage clustering, proceeds as follows. Initially, the 
N countries are treated as N separate groups. The distance between each pair of countries is 
computed, and the two closest countries are then merged into one group, producing N-1 total 
groups (one with two countries, and the rest of size one). Next, the closest two groups are 
merged using a similar method (so that the number of groups becomes N-2), and the process 
is repeated until all countries are merged into one large group. 
The results of the grouping based on the MCI are shown in Figure 1. Countries are identified 
by a three-letter acronym at the bottom of the tree. Countries with central bank reform were 
treated as two separate cases and identified by adding either a “-0” or a “-1” to their 
acronyms, to specify pre- and post-reform periods, respectively. Countries grouped together 
within a given branch tend to share similar central bank legislation along the dimensions 
considered. The large vertical bars in the upper part of the tree indicate that the groups tend 
to be dissimilar, therefore revealing a strong clustering. By inspection, three groups of 
countries, shown in Table 1, emerge. Post-reform countries (with the exception of Chile) tend 
to be fall together under Groups 1 and 2, while Group 3 includes pre- and non-reform 
countries, most of them in the CAR region. To facilitate the comparison across groups, 
Table 2 presents the averages of the MCI and its subcomponents for each group, together 
with the averages of the fiscal deficit, inflation, and the index of structural reforms. The 
results indicate that the legal independence of central banks in Groups 1 and 2 is stronger 
along most of the dimensions considered. In particular, countries in these two groups tend to 
have a more focused mandate on price stability and greater economic independence. On the 
other hand, no differences arise between groups in the LOLR function, while Group 2 tends 
to display a relative low degree of political independence, comparable with pre-reform 
countries. Interestingly, countries in Groups 1 and 2 have lower average inflation combined 
                                                 
12 Jácome (2001) provides a summary of the main features of the central bank legislation in 
Latin America as of end-1990s. 
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Figure 1. Cluster Analysis Based on the Components of the Modified Cukierman, 
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This figure presents the dendrogram of the cluster analysis based on the components of the Modified Cukierman 
index. The list of countries included in the study is provided at the bottom of figure. For countries with legal 
central bank reforms, a “-0”zero indicates the pre-reform sub-period, and a “-1” indicates the post-reform sub-
period. Countries with similar central bank laws in terms of the dimensions of the MCI are shown together and 
linked by lines. Overall, three main groups emerge, with pre- and non-reform countries clustered together (see 
Table 1). 
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Table 1. List of Country Groups Based on Cluster Analysis 
 
Country Period Country Period
Group 1 Group 3
Arg-1 Argentina 1992-2001 Arg-0 Argentina 1992-2001
Bol-1 Bolivia 1990-2002 Bah Bahamas 1990-2002
Chi Chile 1990-2002 Bar Barbados 1990-2002
Col-1 Colombia 1992-2002 Bel Belize 1990-2002
Mex-1 Mexico 1990-2002 Bol-0 Bolivia 1990-2002
Per-1 Peru 1993-2002 Bra Brazil 1990-2002
Col-0 Colombia 1992-2002
Group 2 CR-0 Costa Rica 1990-2002
CR-1 Costa Rica 1990-2002 Ecu-0 Ecuador 1990-1999
Ecu-1 Ecuador 1990-1999 ES-0 El Salvador 1992-2001
ES-1 El Salvador 1992-2001 Gua Guatemala 1990-2002
Hon-1 Honduras 1990-2002 Guy Guyana 1990-2002
Nic-1 Nicaragua 1992-2002 Hon-0 Honduras 1990-2002
Par-1 Paraguay 1990-2002 Jam Jamaica 1993-2002
Uru-1 Uruguay 1990-2002 Mex-0 Mexico 1990-2002
Ven-1 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 1993-2002 Nic-0 Nicaragua 1992-2002
Par-0 Paraguay 1990-2002
Per-0 Peru 1993-2002
DR Republica Dominicana 1990-2002
Sur Suriname 1990-2002
T&T Trinidad and Tobago 1990-2002
Uru-0 Uruguay 1990-2002
Ven-0 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 1993-2002   
 
This table lists the groups of countries resulting from the cluster analysis. Reform countries are indicated with a 
“-0” (pre-reform sub-period) or a “-1” (post-reform sub-period). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics Across Country Groups 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Modified Cukierman Index (average by group) 0.84 0.70 0.44
Political Independence 0.91 0.55 0.27
Government of the Central Bank 0.88 0.45 0.31
Term of office Governor 0.67 0.37 0.46
Who appoints the Governor 1.00 0.33 0.17
Appointment and term of Board 0.83 0.58 0.20
Dismissal of Governor and Board 0.92 0.33 0.24
CEO Allowed to hold another office in government 1.00 0.89 0.70
Central Bank primary objective 0.96 0.69 0.23
Price stability 0.96 0.69 0.23
Economic Independence 0.77 0.78 0.52
Policy formulation 0.75 0.81 0.70
Who formulates monetary policy 0.89 0.85 0.83
Conflict resolution 1.00 0.93 0.78
Central Bank and public debt 0.00 0.50 0.28
Central Bank lending 0.78 0.77 0.45
Advances to government 0.84 0.85 0.60
Loans to government 0.71 0.78 0.41
Beneficiaries of financing 1.00 0.86 0.39
Who decides terms of lending 0.93 0.81 0.55
Interest rates 0.90 1.00 0.45
LOLR 0.50 0.50 0.50
Financial autonomy Central Bank 0.72 0.63 0.35
Accountability 0.93 0.73 0.54
Accountability norms 0.96 0.78 0.50
Transparency 0.83 0.58 0.66
Selected Macroeconomic Variables
Fiscal Deficit (percent of GDP) 2.60 2.31 1.08
Inflation (in percent) 9.83 15.81 35.65
Structural Reform Index 0.60 0.53 0.49
Number of countries 1/ 6 9 23  
 
This table presents average values for the components of Modified Cukierman Index, using the groups of 
countries produced by the cluster analysis exercise. Countries with central bank reform are split in two sub-
periods (pre- and post-reform). 
 
1/ Countries with central bank reform are treated as two cases, corresponding to the pre- and post-reform 
periods. 
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IV.   LEGAL CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN, IS THERE A LINK? 
During the 1990s, the decline of inflation in Latin America and the Caribbean was 
remarkable, from an average of about 500 percent at the beginning of the decade to 7 percent 
in 2002. Interestingly, disinflation in the region was coincident with—and probably 
supported by—a general trend worldwide (Figure 2). The magnitude of disinflation achieved 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, however, suggests that its main driving forces are 
attributable to the economic policies and institutional reform implemented by individual 
countries. This section tests for a negative relationship between increasing CBI and 
inflation.
14 
To provide a first look at the data used in the regressions, Table 3 presents summary statistics 
for selected variables and Table 4 their pair-wise correlations together with the significance 
levels for the null of zero correlation. The sample was split into two groups, separating LAC 
countries (lower triangle) from CAR countries (upper triangle). Several regularities emerge. 
First and foremost, inflation is negatively correlated with the indexes of CBI in both sub-
samples. Second, there is a high positive correlation between the index of structural reforms 
and the indexes of CBI, especially in the LAC sub-sample, which implies that changes to 
central bank legislation were coincident with a broader agenda of structural reforms. Third, 
there is weak evidence that lower fiscal deficits are associated with higher central bank 
independence. Fourth, as expected, the three indexes of CBI are highly correlated in both 
sub-samples. In fact, the information content of the three indexes and their main components 
(i.e., economic and political independence) is similar, especially for the LAC sub-sample, as 
apparent from their correlations (Table 5). 
 
                                                 
14 Despite the dramatic reduction in inflation achieved in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
opposition to increased CBI has gained some ground in recent years, as new legislation has 
been passed undermining previous improvements in central bank autonomy. Examples 
include changes to the central bank charter in Argentina to allow central bank financing of 
the fiscal deficit in 2002, the decision by the Colombian Constitutional Court in 1999 to cap 
mortgage interest rates, and the reform of the central bank charter in Venezuela in 2001 to 
validate the previous transfer of exchange rate devaluation gains to the government. It is also 
relevant to mention the approval of laws in Honduras and Paraguay, requiring central banks 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics by Regions, 1990–2002 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Caribbean countries
Inflation
overall 18.84 50.17 -1.30 368.50 N = 88.00
between 29.15 1.84 82.83 n = 7.00
within 41.90 -64.69 304.51 T-bar = 12.57
Fiscal Deficit
overall -3.19 6.53 -23.52 11.10 N = 70.00
between 5.07 -10.49 4.39 n = 6.00
within 4.75 -16.22 6.81 T-bar = 11.67
Structural Reform Index
o v e r a l l 0 . 6 00 . 0 50 . 5 40 . 6 7 N  = 1 9 . 0 0
between 0.00 0.59 0.60 n = 2.00
within 0.05 0.54 0.67 T-bar = 9.50
GMT total
o v e r a l l 7 . 2 30 . 8 96 . 0 09 . 0 0 N  = 8 8 . 0 0
between 0.95 6.00 8.31 n = 7.00
within 0.18 6.92 7.92 T-bar = 12.57
Cukierman
o v e r a l l 0 . 5 00 . 0 60 . 4 10 . 6 9 N  = 8 8 . 0 0
between 0.06 0.41 0.58 n = 7.00
within 0.03 0.45 0.61 T-bar = 12.57
Modified Cukierman
o v e r a l l 0 . 5 00 . 0 60 . 3 80 . 6 3 N  = 8 8 . 0 0
between 0.06 0.38 0.55 n = 7.00
within
Latin American countries
Inflation overall 19.43 33.36 -1.20 413.30 N = 198.00
between 15.21 4.15 59.14 n = 17.00
within 30.35 -36.51 373.59 T-bar = 11.65
Fiscal Deficit overall 2.88 4.26 -10.73 23.26 N = 193.00
between 2.93 -0.30 11.65 n = 17.00
within 3.23 -18.76 18.09 T-bar = 11.35
Structural Reform Index overall 0.53 0.07 0.37 0.71 N = 168.00
between 0.05 0.44 0.62 n = 17.00
within 0.05 0.40 0.66 T-bar = 9.88
GMT total overall 10.20 2.23 6.00 14.00 N = 198.00
between 1.69 8.00 14.00 n = 17.00
within 1.48 3.90 12.97 T-bar = 11.65
Cukierman overall 0.66 0.16 0.36 0.86 N = 198.00
between 0.13 0.43 0.84 n = 17.00
within 0.10 0.31 0.82 T-bar = 11.65
Modified Cukierman overall 0.64 0.17 0.29 0.86 N = 198.00
between 0.12 0.43 0.85 n = 17.00
within 0.13 0.15 0.87 T-bar = 11.65 
The sample excludes eight years with inflationary episodes above 1,000 percent per year.   - 17 -   
 












Inflation -0.037 -0.688 -0.308 -0.314 -0.462
(0.761) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
Fiscal Deficit 0.228 0.410 -0.262 -0.342 -0.077
(0.001) (0.081) (0.028) (0.004) (0.527)
Structural Reforms Index -0.360 -0.052 0.075 0.075 0.075
(0.000) (0.510) (0.761) (0.761) (0.761)
GMT Total -0.137 -0.046 0.561 0.820 0.863
(0.055) (0.524) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cukierman -0.167 -0.130 0.441 0.819 0.849
(0.019) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Modified Cukierman -0.205 0.003 0.557 0.892 0.903
(0.004) (0.962) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
This table presents pair-wise correlations between selected variables. Correlations in the upper triangle 
correspond to Caribbean countries. Correlations in the lower triangle are for Latin American countries. 
Significance levels for the null of zero correlation are in parenthesis. 
 







GMT, Cukierman 0.730 0.615 0.811
GMT, Modified Cukierman 0.761 0.796 0.891
Cukierman, Modified Cukierman 0.929 0.869 0.896
Caribbean countries
GMT, Cukierman 0.295 0.550 0.830
GMT, Modified Cukierman 0.434 0.312 0.859
Cukierman, Modified Cukierman 0.782 0.452 0.845 
This table presents the pair-wise correlations between the three indexes of legal central bank independence and 
their main sub-components, by regions. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
The sub-indexes of economic and political independence of the Modified Cukierman index do not include 
accountability (which is, however, included in the total Modified Cukierman). Political independence covers the 
rules for appointment and dismissal of the Central Bank governor and board, as well as the Central Bank 
objectives (see Appendix I). In turn, economic independence covers the characteristics of policy formulation 
and various restrictions on central bank lending.   - 18 -   
 
A.   Baseline Results 
Baseline results on the relationship between CBI and inflation were computed using a set of 
bivariate regressions of Inflation on the three indexes of CBI (one at a time to avoid 
multicollinearity). The regressions covered the whole sample, with the exception of a few 
observations corresponding to countries adopting official dollarization (Ecuador 2000–2002 
and El Salvador 2002), and years with hyperinflation.
15 Following the literature (Cukierman 
et al., 1992, De Haan and Kooi, 2000), Inflation was computed as the yearly change in the 
average consumer price index taken from IFS (series 64), and rescaled using π/(1+π) to 
ameliorate potential heteroscedasticity. However, since this treatment has the undesirable 
effect of bounding the dependent variable in the interval [0, 1], affecting the normality 
assumption, an alternative measure, log(1+π) was also applied, with similar results. The 
regressions were computed using OLS with fixed effects at the country level and robust 
standard errors (White, 1980). In all cases, the results (not reported) showed a strong 
negative relationship between increased CBI and inflation, with significant coefficients at the 
one-percent level. 
A somewhat more rigorous test was conducted adding several control variables. As before, 
Inflation was treated as endogenous, with the target variables being the three indexes of 
Central Bank Independence, taken one at a time. The set of control variables included the 
following: a Banking Crisis Dummy, to isolate the inflationary effects associated with 
systemic banking problems, a Fixed Exchange Regime Dummy to account for the effects of 
exchange rate anchoring on inflation, and International Inflation, to control for the 
contribution of the external disinflation trend . The inclusion of the Banking Crises Dummy is 
important, since banking crises were more common after central bank reform, with 7 
episodes against 1 in the pre-reform period.
16 Therefore, ignoring this effect would introduce 
a bias against the hypothesis tested. The inclusion of the Exchange Regime Dummy follows 
previous studies (Cukierman et al., 2002, De Haan and Kooi, 2000). It was constructed from 
the IMF database on de facto exchange regimes, using a one for regimes classified as: 
“another currency as legal tender,” “currency board,” or “conventional peg against a single 
                                                 
15 A filter was applied, excluding eight cases with yearly inflation above 1,000 percent per 
year: Argentina 1990 (2,315); Brazil 1990 (2,740); Brazil 1992 (1,023); Brazil 1993 (1,927); 
Brazil 1994 (2,076); Nicaragua 1990 (3,128); Nicaragua 1991 (7,755); Peru 1990 (7,482). 
Applying more restrictive filters (i.e., filtering out cases below the 1,000 threshold) would 
produce no significant changes in the sample. The next high inflation episode is Brazil 1991 
(413), and there are four additional cases with inflation between 150 and 400 percent per 
year. 
16 The list of systemic banking crises in the sampled countries is: Argentina (2002), 
Colombia (1998), Colombia (1999), Dominican Republic (2002–2003), Ecuador (1998–
1999), Mexico (1995), Nicaragua (2000–2001), Uruguay (2002), Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (1994–1995).   - 19 -   
 
currency,” and zero otherwise. The first year after the introduction of a fixed regime, and the 
last year before switching to a floating regime, were also given a value of zero to account for 
lags in the effects of exchange rate anchoring on prices, and the fact that the abandonment of 
a hard peg tends to coincide with rising inflationary pressures. The International Inflation 
was proxied by the average inflation rate of industrial countries, computed from IFS 
(series 110). 
 
An initial estimation was performed using OLS and with fixed effects at the country level. 
However, taking into account both the cross-sectional and a time-series dimensions of the 
data, the errors were checked for heteroscedasticity across panels (countries) and for 
autocorrelation. As for heteroscedasticity, a likelihood-ratio test was implemented comparing 
the results of the unrestricted model (i.e., allowing for a heteroscedastic error structure) with 
those obtained from the restricted (homoscedastic) model. The test supported the presence of 
heteroscedasticity across panels. As for autocorrelation, a test in panel-data models proposed 
by Wooldridge (2002) also indicated the presence of serial correlation. Based on these 
results, the estimation was computed again using Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS), allowing for heteroscedasticity across countries and a common AR(1) error process. 
The results are presented in Table 6. Columns [1]-[3] indicate that, after controlling for 
banking crises and the degree of exchange rate rigidity, higher central bank independence, as 
measured by any of the three indexes, is related to lower inflation. The coefficient associated 
with the Cukierman index is comparable in magnitude to the MCI, reflecting the close 
relationship between the two series. As expected, fixed exchange regimes are associated with 
lower inflation rates. These results are qualitatively robust to the addition of world inflation, 
as indicated by the regressions presented in columns [4]-[6]. The new variable enters 
positively and significantly at conventional levels, in line with the observed co-movement 
described earlier. As an alternative specification, the regressions were computed again, after 
adding the Fiscal Deficit in percent of GDP to control for underlying inflationary causes, 
with similar results.
17 This specification, however, was rejected since the Fiscal Deficit 
entered not significantly in the regressions, which is in line with previous work (see for 
example Click, 1998, and Fisher et al., 2002), although a recent study suggests otherwise 
(Catao and Terrones, 2003). 
B.   An Alternative Specification: The Role of Structural Reforms 
While suggestive, these results are subject to two main challenges. First, they may be 
influenced by an omitted variable bias, since central bank reforms are usually part of broader 
policy packages that include privatizations, trade reform, and other structural policies that 
affect macroeconomic performance, including inflation. Equally important, broader 
                                                 
17 This variable was measured by the nominal deficit of the central government on a cash 
basis, as reported in the IFS (series 80), and scaled by nominal GDP, also taken from IFS 
(series 99b).   - 20 -   
 
Table 6. Panel Regressions of Inflation on Contemporaneous Central Bank Independence 
 
[ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ][ 5 ][ 6 ]
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Dummy Banking Crises 0.023 0.023 0.026* 0.036** 0.037** 0.038**
[0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Dummy Exch. Regime -0.082*** -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.076***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
World Inflation (in percent) 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.033***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
GMT Total -0.009*** -0.005**
[0.002] [0.002]
Cukierman Weighted -0.129*** -0.066**
[0.031] [0.030]
Total Modified Cukierman -0.137*** -0.079***
[0.026] [0.025]
Observations 297 297 297 297 297 297
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 2 42 42 42 42 42 4
R h o 0 . 7 40 . 7 40 . 7 20 . 6 70 . 6 60 . 6 7
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
This table presents the results of panel regressions for the whole sample of countries during 1990–2002, 
excluding (eight) hyperinflation episodes. The dependent variable is inflation (π), scaled as π/(1+π). The 
coefficients were estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), allowing for heteroscedasticity 
across countries and an AR(1) autocorrelation structure within countries, with a (Rho) coefficient common to all 
countries. The target variables are the three indexes of CBI. Control variables include a Dummy Banking 
Crises, which equals one during years with banking crises and zero elsewhere, A Dummy Regime, which equals 
one during periods of fixed exchange regimes and zero elsewhere, and World Inflation, measured by the 
average inflation of industrial countries. 
 
 
economic reforms may entail changes in the behavior of market participants, affecting money 
demand, the direction of capital flows, and the alternatives to finance a given fiscal position, 
all of which may also have an effect on inflation. A second caveat is the possibility of reverse 
causality. The argument here is that the decision of implementing central bank reform may 
depend itself on inflation. For example, central bank reform may be easier to implement—
and actually implemented—in the wake of a disinflation period. 
To take into account a possible omitted variable bias, the regressions were computed again 
after adding an index of Structural Reforms as an additional control. This index, constructed 
by the Inter-American Development Bank, captures the evolution of economic reform in 
several sectors, including labor markets, financial markets, tax, trade, and privatizations. 
Besides, as the index does not incorporate changes in central bank legislation, it is a good 
complement to the indexes of CBI considered here. 
The inclusion of the additional control rendered the coefficients of CBI statistically non-
significant in all regressions (columns [1]-[3] in Table 7). On the other hand, the coefficients 
of the Structural Reforms entered negative and statistically significant at the one-percent   - 21 -   
 
level. It is worth noticing the change in the sample size after the inclusion of the new 
variable, which is mainly due to lack of data on structural reforms for years 2001–2002, as 
well as for some Caribbean countries (Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana and Suriname). 
However, the results are not attributable to differences in the samples, since they remained 
after the samples were matched. At first glance, this outcome suggests that the effects of 
central bank reform on inflation can be better understood in the context of broader economic 
reform packages, and that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation reported 
previously may be driven by an omitted variable bias. However, this conclusion merits 
further checking. In particular, the effects of central bank reform on inflation may not be 
immediate, since the implementation of a new institutional environment usually requires the 
enactment of more specific regulations, and the build-up of central bank reputation, which is 
the main factor from the perspective of market participants. 
Table 7. Panel Regressions of Inflation on Contemporaneous Central Bank Independence 
(Including Structural Reforms) 
 








Dummy Banking Crises 0.044** 0.045** 0.045** 0.044** 0.048** 0.048**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Dummy Exch. Regime -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.051***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
World Inflation (in percent) 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007]
Index Structural Reform -0.421*** -0.428*** -0.412*** -0.399*** -0.416*** -0.408***
[0.105] [0.100] [0.102] [0.090] [0.090] [0.087]
GMT Total -0.002 -0.005***
[0.002] [0.002]
Cukierman Weighted -0.039 -0.068***
[0.033] [0.023]
Total Modified Cukierman -0.043 -0.071***
[0.029] [0.021]
Observations 198 198 198 149 149 149
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19
Rho 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.44 0.44 0.44
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
This table presents the results of panel regressions for the whole sample of countries during 1990–2002, 
excluding (eight) hyperinflation episodes.  The dependent variable is inflation (π), scaled as π/(1+π). The 
coefficients were estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares, allowing for heteroscedasticity across 
countries and an AR(1) autocorrelation structure within countries, with a (Rho) coefficient common to all 
countries. The target variables are the three indexes of CBI. Columns [1] to [3] use the contemporaneous 
indexes of CBI. Columns [4] to [6] use the (three-lag) indexes of CBI. Control variables include a Dummy 
Banking Crises, which equals one during years with banking crises and zero elsewhere, A Dummy Regime, 
which equals one during periods of fixed exchange regimes and zero elsewhere, World Inflation, measured by 
the average inflation of industrial countries, and an Index of Structural Reforms which varies in the interval [0, 
1] with higher values indicating deeper economic reforms. 
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To check for the possibility of lagged effects associated with changes in central bank 
legislation, the regressions were computed again exploring various combinations, with one to 
four lags for the indexes of CBI. The use of lagged values may also contribute to reduce the 
possibility of reverse causality mentioned previously. With this treatment, the coefficients of 
CBI became statistically significant again for three- and four-lag specifications (columns [4]-
[6] in Table 7). As a robustness check, parallel regressions were computed using one to four 
lags for both the indexes of CBI and structural reforms, with similar results. An alternative 
specification, including an interactions term between the CBI indexes and the structural 
reform index, produced non-significant coefficients possibly due to multicollinearity, and 
was rejected.
18 All these conclusions hold when the sample is restricted to the LAC sub-
sample, which includes most of the reform countries. 
Overall, these results point to the complementary nature of various aspects of economic 
reform, and are consistent with the hypothesis that both structural reform and increased CBI 
played a role in disinflation in the sampled countries during the 1990s. However, a causal 
relationship running from central bank reform to inflation performance cannot be established 
from these exercises, due to the possibility of reverse causality. In fact, the use of lagged CBI 
may not be sufficient to correct the potential endogeneity of central bank reform, especially 
since inflation tends to display inertia. 
C.   Accounting for Endogeneity 
A more appropriate treatment to account for the possible endogeneity of central bank reform 
requires the use of instrumental variables. This section uses two alternative methods: 
Generalized Two Stage Least Squares (G2SLS) developed by Balestra and Varadharajan-
Krishnakumar (1987) and Error Correction Two-Stage Least Squares (EC2LSL) described in 
Balgati and Chang (2000). In both cases, lagged values of the MCI were used as instruments 
for CBI. The results of the first stages, not reported, suggested that the instrument was 
appropriate, with the associated coefficient significant at the one-percent level in all cases. 
The regressions are presented in Table 8. Those in columns [1] and [2] treat CBI as 
endogenous and apply the Swamy and Arora (1972) estimators of the variance components, 
which include a small-sample correction. The use of a random-effects estimator requires 
accepting that the idiosyncratic error term is uncorrelated with the set of explanatory 
variables, which is a strong assumption given the nature of the data. However, the Hausman 
(1978) specification test was unable to reject the null of coefficient equality between the 
random- and the fixed-effects models in all cases, as indicated by the p-values reported at the 
bottom of the table. As before, the results indicate that inflation in the sampled countries is 
positively correlated with world inflation, higher during banking crises, and negatively 
correlated with structural reforms. However, the coefficient of CBI became not significant. 
                                                 
18 The correlation between the indexes of central bank independence and the interaction term 
exceeded 0.92 in all cases.   - 23 -   
 
Table 8. Panel Regressions of Inflation on MCI Using Instrumental Variables 
 



















Dummy Banking Crises 0.117*** 0.102*** 0.112*** 0.097*** 0.124*** 0.108***
[0.028] [0.026] [0.028] [0.026] [0.029] [0.027]
Dummy Exch. Regime -0.056** -0.073*** -0.054** -0.070*** -0.060*** -0.074***
[0.024] [0.021] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020]
World Inflation (in percent) 0.030** 0.037*** 0.028** 0.032*** 0.029** 0.033***
[0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012]
Index Structural Reform -0.444*** -0.547*** -0.483*** -0.643*** -0.524*** -0.643***
[0.129] [0.114] [0.158] [0.131] [0.137] [0.119]
Total Modified Cukierman -0.100 0.070 -0.109 0.068 -0.073 0.072
[0.109] [0.062] [0.117] [0.063] [0.096] [0.057]
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 1 91 91 91 91 91 9
R-Sq. within 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24
R-Sq. between 0.49 0.60 0.47 0.59 0.53 0.60
R-Sq. overall 0.36 0.41 0.35 0.41 0.38 0.41
Estimator of variance S-A S-A S-A S-A B-C B-C
Ho: Difference in coef. not systematic 
(p-values) 0.433 0.509 0.286
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
This table presents the results of panel regressions for the whole sample of countries during 1990–2002, 
excluding (eight) hyperinflation episodes. The dependent variable is inflation (π), scaled as π/(1+π). The 
regressions were computed using instrumental variables, to account for the possible endogeneity of Central 
Bank Independence and Structural Reforms. Two estimation methods were used: Generalized Two-Stage least 
Squares (G2SLS) and Error Correction Two-Stage least Squares (EC2SLS), each combined with two different 
estimators of the variance components: the Swamy and Arora (1972, S-A), which contains a small sample 
correction, and the consistent estimators proposed by Balgati and Chang (2000, B-C). In columns [1] and [2] 
CBI was instrumented by the lagged values of the MCI, while columns [3] to [6] further instrument structural 
reforms by its lagged values. Control variables include a Dummy Banking Crises, which equals one during 
years with banking crises and zero elsewhere, A Dummy Regime, which equals one during periods of fixed 
exchange regimes and zero elsewhere, and World Inflation, measured by the average inflation of industrial 
countries. 
 
While the case of reverse causality from inflation to structural reforms is less likely, parallel 
regressions are presented in columns [3] and [4], treating as endogenous both CBI and 
structural reforms (the latter also instrumented by its lagged values). The regressions reported 
in columns [5] and [6], use the Balgati and Chang (2000) consistent estimator of the variance 
components. In both cases, the results are qualitatively similar to those discussed previously. 
Summing up, these regressions fail to show a significant causal relation running from CBI to 
inflation in all cases, and indicate that the negative coefficients of CBI  reported in the 
previous section are biased downwards, due to the possible endogenous nature of central 
bank reform. Similar conclusions were obtained using the other two indexes of CBI (not 
reported). At face value, these results suggest that the extraordinary reduction in inflation 
achieved in Latin America and the Caribbean during the nineties is probably attributable to a 
broad range of economic policies, with a negligible role to the legal central bank reform. A   - 24 -   
 
remaining caveat, however, is the validity of these indexes to account for the evolution of 
effective CBI. 
V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
After two decades of high inflation, most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
entered into a phase of more prudent macroeconomic management in the 1990s, with the aim 
of reducing inflation and improving economic performance. A far-reaching reform of central 
bank legislation was adopted in many countries to strengthen central bank autonomy from 
the government and facilitate the control of inflation. 
Based on the assessment of central bank charters and the relevant part of constitutions in 24 
Latin American and Caribbean countries during the 1990s, three conclusions emerge. First, a 
comparison of legal CBI in the sampled countries shows significant regional differences 
between LAC and CAR countries. Central bank reform was widely implemented in LAC 
during the 1990s, but largely absent among CAR countries. As a result, most central bank in 
LAC today enjoy higher formal operational and political independence, while CAR central 
banks are still politically dependent on the executive branch. Leaving aside a few 
hyperinflationary episodes in LAC, however, inflation performance in LAC and CAR 
countries did not differ much during the 1990s. 
Using three alternative indexes of legal CBI and after controlling for international inflation, 
the exchange regime, and the occurrence of banking crises, a negative correlation between 
legal CBI and inflation is obtained. This result survives the inclusion of an index of structural 
reforms that illustrates the  complementary nature of various aspects of economic reform. 
Taking into account the possible endogeneity of central bank reform, however, the results fail 
to support the existence of a causal relationship running from legal CBI to inflation. This 
suggests that the extraordinary reduction in inflation achieved in the region during the 1990s 
is probably due to a combination of policies and cannot be attributed to legal central bank 
reforms, which warns against excessive optimism on the effects of legal central bank 
independence on inflationary performance. On the other hand, an important caveat remains, 
since the indexes of CBI used in this paper are, at best, imperfect measures of effective CBI. 
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Values “Modified  Cukierman”  Index 
Criteria (weights) 
Values 
Central Bank CEO (0.20) 
 
1. Term of office of CEO (0.25)  
- Equal or more than 8 years 
- 6  years or more but less than 8 years 
- Equal to 5 years 
- Equal to 4 years 
- Less than 4 years 
 
2. Who appoints the CEO (0.25) 
- The Central Bank Board 
- Council composed by executive and 
legislative branch and Central Bank Board 
- By legislative branch 
- By executive branch 
- By one or two members of executive 
branch 
 
3.  Provisions for dismissal of CEO (0.25) 
- No provision 
- Only for non-policy reasons (e.g., incapa-
bility, or violation of law) 
- At a discretion of Central Bank Board 
- For policy reasons at legislative branch’s 
discretion 
- At legislative branch’s discretion 
- For policy reasons at executive branch’s 
discretion 
- At executive branch’s discretion 
 
4. CEO allowed to hold another office in 
government (0.25) 
- Prohibited by law 
- Not allowed unless authorized by executive 
branch 






































Central Bank Board (0.20) 
 
1. Term of office of Governor(0.20) 
- More than presidential period 
- The period does not coincide 
- Same period as the executive branch 
- Less than executive branch or not 
specified in the law 
 
2. Who appoints the Governor (0.20) 
- Double process (Executive/Legislative), 
or through the Central Bank Board if also 
appointed in a double process, or for longer 
or overlapped periods with respect to the 
executive branch 
- The executive branch directly or through 
the Central Bank Board, when this is 
directly appointed by the executive branch 
 
3. Appointment and term of office rest of 
the Board (0.20) 
- More than presidential period or for a 
non-defined period 
- For the same period as the President of the 
Republic with overlap 
- Double process for the same period  
- Executive and private sector appoint the 
majority of directors for same period or less 
- Executive branch appoints the majority 
for the same period or less 
 
4.  Dismissal of Board members (0.30) 
- Double process approved by the Senate or 
by a qualified majority and for violations 
codified in legislation 
- By an independent Central Bank Board  
- Double process with simple majority, 
based on policy decisions or due to 
subjective reasons 
- By executive branch or subordinated 
Central Bank Board due to legal reasons 
- By executive branch or subordinated 
Central Bank Board due to policy or 
subjective reasons, or no legal provision 
 
5. CEO allowed to hold another office in 
government (0.10) 
- Prohibited by law 

















































0.5   - 26 -  APPENDIX I 
 
executive branch 




Central Bank objectives (0.15) 
 
5. Central Bank objectives 
- Price stability is the only or major goal, and 
in case of conflict with government, the 
Central Bank has final authority 
- Price stability is the only goal 
- Price stability along with other objectives 
that do not seem to conflict with the former 
- Price stability along with other objectives 
of potentially conflicting goals (e.g., full 
employment) 
- Central Bank charter does not contain any 
objective 
-Some goals appear in the charter but price 

















Central Bank objectives (0.15) 
 
6.  Fundamental objective (1.00) 
- Price stability is the single or primary 
objective 
- Price stability together with non-
conflicting objectives but without priority 
- Price stability plus others goals including 
stability of financial system that may 
conflict with the former, without priority 
- Price stability together with objective of 
economic growth / economic development 
with no priority 















Policy formulation (0.15) 
 
6. Who formulates monetary policy (0.25) 
- Central Bank has the legal authority 
- Central Bank participates together with 
government 
- Central Bank in an advisory capacity 
- Government alone formulates monetary 
policy 
 
7.  Government directives and resolution of 
conflicts (0.50) 
- Central Bank given final authority over 
issues defined in the law as objectives 
- Government has final authority over issues 
not clearly defined as Central Bank goals 
- Final decision up to a council whose 
members are from the Central Bank, 
executive branch, and legislative branch 
- Legislative branch has final authority 
- Executive branch has final authority, but 
subject to due process and possible protest 
by Central Bank 
- Executive branch has unconditional 
authority over policy 
 
8.  Central Bank given active role in 


































Policy formulation (0.15) 
 
7. Who formulates monetary policy (0.50) 
- Central Bank has the legal authority 
- Executive branch holds the final decision 
on exchange rate policy  
- Central Bank participates on monetary 
policy formulation in an advisory capacity 
or faces legal limitations on monetary 
instruments or interest rates 
- Government formulates monetary policy 
alone 
 
8. Government directives and resolution of 
conflicts (0.30) 
- Central Bank given final authority over 
issues defined in the law as objectives 
- Government has final authority over 
issues not clearly defined as Central Bank 
goals 
- Final decision up to a council whose 
members are from the Central Bank, 
executive branch, and legislative branch 
- Legislative branch has final authority 
- Executive branch has final authority, but 
subject to due process and possible protest 
by Central Bank 
- Executive branch has unconditional 
authority over policy 
 
9. Central Bank involvement in debt 
approval (0.20) 
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- Legally required to provide opinion on 
technical aspects 




Central Bank lending (0.50) 
 
9. Limitations on advances (0.30) 
- Advances to government prohibited 
- Permitted but subject to limits in terms of 
absolute cash amounts or relative limits 
(government revenues) 
- Permitted subject to relatively 
accommodative limits (more than 15 percent 
of government revenues) 
- No legal limitations on advances. Subject 
to negotiations with government 
 
10.  Limitations on securitized lending (0.20) 
- The same as in 9 
 
11. Who decides control of terms of lending 
to government (0.20) 
- Central bank controls terms and conditions 
- Terms of lending specified in law, or 
Central Bank given legal authority to set 
conditions 
- Law leaves decision to negotiations 
between the Central Bank and government 
- Executive branch alone decides and 
imposes to the Central Bank 
 
12.  Beneficiaries of Central Bank lending 
(0.10) 
- Only central government 
- Central and state governments, as well as 
further political subdivisions 
- Also public enterprises can borrow 
- Central Bank can lend to all of the above 
and to the private sector 
 
13.  Type of limits when they exist (0.05) 
- As an absolute cash amount 
- As a percentage of Central Bank capital or 
other liabilities 
- As a percentage of government revenues 
- As a percentage of government expenditure 
 
14.  Maturity of loans (0.05) 
- Limited to a maximum of 6 months 
- Limited to a maximum of 1 year 
- Limited to a maximum of more than one 
year 




















































Central Bank lending (0.40) 
 
10.  Limitations on advances (0.15) 
- Advances to government prohibited 
- Limited by small percentage of 
government revenues or by monetary 
program 
- Allowed under lax limits (more than 
15 percent of government revenues 
- Allowed without limits 
 
11. Lending to Government (0.30) 
- Not allowed  
- In the secondary market with restricted 
limits 
- In the secondary market with lax or 
without limits 
- In the primary market with limits or 
approved by Central Bank Board with a 
qualified majority 
- In the primary market without limits 
 
12. Who decides financing conditions to 
government (0.10) 
- Central Bank defines terms and conditions 
- Defined by law 
- The law allows negotiations between 
government and Central Bank 
- Executive decides independently 
 
13. Beneficiaries of Central Bank financing 
(0.10) 
- Only the government 
- Government plus local governments 
- All of the above plus public enterprises 
- All of the above and to the private sector 
 
14. Interest rates in advances or lending 
(0.10) 
- At market rates 
- Interest rates not specified in law 
- At below market rates 
 
15. LOLR (0.15) 
- For liquidity purposes with limitations (up 
to 180 days or up to banks’ equity), or no 
legal provision for emergency lending. 
- For liquidity at conditions defined by the 
central bank 
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15.Restrictions on interest rates (0.05) 
- Must be at market rate 
- On loans to government can not be lower 
than a certain floor 
- Interest rate on Central Bank loans can not 
exceed a certain ceiling 
- No explicit legal provisions regarding 
interest rate in Central Bank loans 
- No interest rate charge on government’s 
borrowing from Central Bank 
 
16. Prohibition on Central Bank lending in 
primary market to Government (0.05) 
- Prohibition from buying government 
securities in primary market 
























rediscount of commercial bank loans 
- Open assistance to cope with solvency 
problems 
- To finance bank restructuring and/or 
paying deposit insurance 
 
16. Financial autonomy (0.10) 
- Government should maintain central 
capital integrity 
- Government is legally allowed to 
capitalize the central bank 
- The law does not allow the government to 
capitalize the central bank 





17. Accountability of  Central Banks (0.75) 
- Reports to executive branch and informs 
at least annually to Congress 
- Reports to the executive once a year and 
submits an annual report to Congress 
- Annual report to the executive. Informs to 
the executive branch whenever fundamental 
disequilibria emerge, or reports through the 
media without specific periodicity 
- Issues annual report at specific time 
- Distributes an annual report without 
establishing particular period of time for it 
 
18. Central Bank transparency (0.25) 
- Discloses detailed financial statements at 
least once a year with a certification of an 
independent auditor 
- Discloses consolidated financial 
statements at least once a year with seal of 
the Banking Superintendent or other public 
sector authority 
- Discloses financial statements at least 
once a year, certified by an internal auditor 
- Publishes partial financial statements  
- Does not publish financial statements or 
the law authorizes the central bank to 
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